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A Guest Lecture on Social Software
Jan van Eijck
Rohit Parikh, visitor to the project, has delivered a NIAS lecture on social
software. On the next day, the project members discuss the contents and the
reception of his talk. An ethicist (professor of ethics) has joined the project
team, and a visiting political scientist is also present.
Logician: It is such a pity I had to miss Rohit’s lecture. And Rohit himself
has dashed off now, to a conference in Paris. On the day before the talk, one
of the NIAS fellows asked me with a worried look on his face what the word
“algorithm” meant that he had seen in the lecture announcement, and could
we please make sure that our guest lecturer knew that part of the audience
was unfamiliar—even uncomfortable—with the jargon of computer science
and logic? So we forewarned Rohit, of course. Now you all understand why I
am curious how it went. Can anyone tell me?
Philosopher: Yes, I did get the impression that part of the audience was
a bit suspicious of logicians and computer scientists taking on problems in
humanities. The NIAS audience consists of highly articulate opinion leaders
in the field of humanities and social sciences, but some of them seemed wary
about the methods of the exact sciences.
Logician: It seems to me that it is quite important to articulate our answers to
the typical questions and worries of such an audience. The kind of objections
that were raised on this particular occasion will no doubt be raised again
and again when one tries to outline the task and goals of the social software
enterprise.
Computer Scientist: Let’s recall what went on, then. I will start, and maybe
the others can all comment, so that we get at a reasonable reconstruction. The
main theme of the talk, of course, was an outline of the conception of social
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software as an interrelation of (i) logical structure, (ii) incentive structure, and
(iii) knowledge transfer. By the choice of his examples, Rohit made clear that
improving a social process involves analysis of what goes on (logical structure),
understanding what makes the participants in the process “tick” (incentive
structure), and understanding the flow of knowledge that takes place during
the process (knowledge transfer).
Philosopher: Rohit took great care to explain his terminology and conceptual
tool set, by the way. His explanation of what an algorithm is, for instance,
used the example of Euclid’s recipe for calculating the greatest common divi-
sor of two positive whole numbers.
Computer Scientist: Yes, a nice illustration indeed. The calculation is based
on the insight that if you have two positive whole numbers, A and B, with A
larger than B, then replacing the larger number by A−B does not affect the
set of common divisors of the pair. As soon as this is clear, it is also clear that
Euclid’s procedure for finding the greatest common divisor has to be correct.
Logician: Yes, yes, but I suppose we can skip all that for now. How was the
talk received? What were the questions?
Philosopher: The talk itself was very well attuned to the audience, it seemed
to me. As for the questions, well, various people expressed doubts about the
use of formal methods in trying to capture aspects of human interaction. Their
main worry seemed to be that the essence of what goes on in the ways human
beings behave towards one another and give meaning to their interactions
might get lost in the mathematical analysis.
Computer Scientist: As I remember, Rohit had various things to say about
this. One of the points he made was about the virtue of idealisation and
abstraction. Analysis of the trajectories of moving bodies like flying cannon
balls always starts by making some unwarranted but very useful assumptions:
that there is no air resistance, or that there is no drag from the rotation of the
earth. These assumptions are necessary to get started. Indeed, it takes great
skill to find the right abstractions; this is what progress of the natural sciences
is all about. In our understanding of the movement of cannon balls it turns
out to be illuminating to disregard earth rotation, but for understanding the
emergence of cyclones the drag from the rotation of the earth is an essential
element.
Philosopher: Another thing that could be said—and if I remember well Rohit
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touched on this too—is that there is no pretense that the abstractions fit the
aspects of reality one tries to understand in every detail. Same for social
software. A social software analysis might be useful despite the fact that it
does not explain and is not meant to explain all that there is to explain about
what goes on when human beings interact in institutions.
Computer Scientist: Can we elaborate on this still further? A related ques-
tion was asked by Donald Light. He questioned the main paradigm of many
mathematical approaches to economy, where the starting axiom is that human
beings are always maximizing their interest. What is it that warrants this as-
sumption? Selfish individuals surely are not the only possible paradigm? I
cannot remember how Rohit handled this.
Political Scientist: For one thing, Rohit agreed that homo sapiens is not the
same animal as homo economicus. As a matter of fact, the abstractions of
economics were borrowed from a psychological fashion called behaviourism.
Fortunately, psychologists have now abandoned this, and it is to be hoped
that economics will follow suit. You might want to have a look at [1] if you
are interested.
Cognitive Scientist: Unfortunately, this was only mentioned in passing, for the
death blow to psychological behaviourism was dealt by cognitive science. An
important development in our field is that subjective feelings of happiness and
despair can be correlated to objective happenings in the brain. ‘Feeling good’
turns out to have a physical basis, and what is more, the way people report
on how they feel corresponds quite well with the findings of fMRI scans [3;
4].
Political Scientist: A recent plea to take these findings into account in public
policy making was made by economist Richard Layard [5; 6]. Layard argues
that the key question economists should ask themselves is this. How can we
explain that since 1950, despite a huge increase in income, average happiness
among people in the West has not increased? For more information I can
recommend the World Database of Happiness on the web [7].
Computer Scientist: Ah, the site maintained by our Dutch happiness professor
Ruut Veenhoven, right? Yes, a visit to his website always cheers me up. At
the very least such information makes clear that money is not everything.
Philosopher: None of this came up in yesterday’s discussion, but Rohit men-
tioned the fact that social procedures often have parameters that can be
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adjusted to reflect participant attitude. For instance, Steven Brams and his
co-workers have developed algorithms for mediating the property settlement
in a divorce. Suppose you and your ex-partner want to use this software. Then
the starting point is for each of you to divide 100 points over the common
property items, reflecting your individual valuation of the items. Next, use
the algorithm to decide what is the agreement that will maximize happiness of
each of you, and is most fair. Now suppose you want to do your ex-partner a
good turn. Then you can decide that she is allowed to divide 150 points, and
you are content with 50 points. This shows that the social software algorithm
is really just a tool; it is completely up to you to decide just how greedy you
want to be.
Logician: A topic that strikes me as relevant in this context are the game-
theoretical paradoxes, such as the Allais paradox, the Elsberg paradox, or the
St. Petersburg betting paradox. Were any of those mentioned?
Computer Scientist: I don’t think so.
Philosopher: Can anyone explain, please?
Logician: Rohit and I discussed the St. Petersburg paradox at some other
occasion. The St. Petersburg game is played by flipping a fair coin until it
comes up tails, and the total number of flips, n, determines the prize, which
equals 2n euros. If the coin comes up tails the first time, the prize is 21 = 2
euros, and the game ends. If the coin comes up heads, it is flipped again until
it shows tails. So if the coin comes up heads the first and the second time,
and tails the third time, the prize is 23 = 8 euros, and so on. The relevant
events are sequences of head flips followed by a tail flip, and the probability
of the sequence of n − 1 head flips followed by a tail flip is 1 over 2n. The
prize for this event is 2n euros, so the expected payoff (prize times likelihood)
is 1 euro. Now the space of possible events is infinite, and each of these has
an expected payoff of 1 euro. So the value of the game is infinite. A rational
gambler would enter the game if the price of entry was less than the value.
Still, most people would be reluctant to offer even 25 euros for playing the
game.
Computer Scientist: What does this show? That most people are irrational?
Or that there is something wrong with the underlying concept of rationality?
Logician: Daniel Bernoulli, who invented the paradox—he was a mathematics
professor in St. Petersburg for some time—believed the latter. He observed
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that the calculation of expected value does not take into account that money
has a decreasing marginal utility: money means less to the rich than it does to
the poor. However greedy an individual is, an extra assumption of diminishing
marginal utility will explain why human beings tend to reject the bet.
Computer Scientist: But it is well known that this does not resolve the para-
dox. For if you give me a function for calculating the decrease in utility,
then I can use that function for constructing a new version of the game, and
the paradox reappears. Discussion and links can easily be found on the in-
ternet, by the way. http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2003/11/st_
petersburg_p.html
Philosopher: I can think of a different and very rational reason for refusing
to play the game. Ask yourself who is supposed to act as bank, if the game
is played? The problem is that it takes infinite wealth to underwrite it. If
Yukos or Gazprom invite offers to play the St Petersburg game, I will abstain.
Chances are they are not rich enough to pay up just when I am about to collect
real money.
Computer Scientist: Let’s get back to the discussion after Rohit’s lecture. A
completely different issue was brought up by Gu¨l Ozyegin. Is the attempt to
describe human behaviour in abstract (and maybe quantified) terms in any
way related to the attempts of damage insurance lawyers who tried to calculate
the monetary value of their clients who were killed in the 9/11 disaster, for use
by the heirs of the life insurance policy owners? The dishwashers in the WTC
restaurants were worth much less than the high profile chief executives that
were killed. Gu¨l described these lawyers as a kind of vultures, I remember,
and expressed moral qualms about any attempts to describe the worth of a
human life in terms of money.
Philosopher: I have no notes of how the actual discussion went on this point,
and I must admit I got lost.
Political Scientist: The fact that people make money because others have died
is a fact of life. That cannot be the moral issue. The same holds for the fact
that some life insurance policies are worth more than others.
Ethicist: If these damage insurance lawyers work on a ‘no win no fee’ basis
then there is a moral issue, I suppose. For then they may induce their clients
to engage in endless litigation, and this—it has been argued—generates a
claims culture that is clearly not in the interest of the community. In many
6 A Guest Lecture on Social Software
countries of European Union—including the Netherlands—‘no win no fee’ is
against the law.
Political Scientist: The case is not clear cut. Other countries allow what is
known as conditional fee agreements (cfas). Under such agreements, if you
win your case, you must pay your solicitor’s fees and any expenses for items
such as experts’ reports, so-called disbursements. If you lose, you need pay
no fees to your solicitor. However, you may have to pay your opponent’s
legal costs and both sides’ disbursements. So also in these cases there is a
mechanism to discourage pursuing weak cases. Conditional fees are subject
to regulations which set out what a solicitor must tell the client. A solicitor
who does not abide by the regulations runs the risk of not getting paid at all,
win or lose.
Computer Scientist: I suppose that finding out what is the effect of the fee
structure for attorneys on patterns of litigation in a country is also social
software analysis?
Philosopher: But it seems to me that we need have no qualms about ex-
pressing what someone’s life is worth in quantitative terms. Quality Adjusted
Life Year (QALY) has been proposed in the medical profession as a measure
for combined quantity and quality of life. QALY calculations are useful for
measuring efficacy of medical treatment. QALY calculation takes one year of
perfect health-life expectancy to be worth 1, but regards one year of less than
perfect life expectancy as less than 1. Suppose the prognosis for a patient
is to die within one year, with quality of life fallen from 1 to 0.4. Then an
intervention which keeps the patient alive for an additional four years rather
than die within the year, and where quality of life falls from 1 to 0.6 on the
continuum will generate 2.0 QALYs: 4× 0.6 for the extra life years at quality
0.6, minus 1 year at quality 0.4 which would have been the result of no inter-
vention. The definition is in any medical dictionary, or you can look it up in
Wikipedia. What is the moral worry?
Computer Scientist: In my notes, there is also an entry on how to take the
non-rational into account in rational analysis of human behaviour. In this
context, Michael Suk-Young Chwe’s Rational Ritual was mentioned [2].
Philosopher: Yes, that is a beautiful book. I happen to have it with me. It
illustrates that rituals that appear at first sight to be completely non-rational
turn out to have a strong rational element. The rationale of many public
rituals comes to light if one views them as procedures for creating common
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knowledge.
Political Scientist: Ah, common knowledge is what is generated when I send
out emails with long cc: lists. I only use those for invitations, when I want
to generate common knowledge of who is also invited, so that everybody who
gets invited knows what kind of party to expect.
Philosopher: Chwe argues that the wish to create common knowledge is be-
hind many social rituals. It explains Apple’s decision to introduce their (then)
new Macintosh computer during the 1984 Super Bowl TV show. Look here
(quotes from Chapter 1 of the book [2]):
By airing the commercial during the Super Bowl, Apple did not simply
inform each viewer about the Macintosh; Apple also told each viewer
that many other viewers were informed about the Macintosh.
Creating common knowledge in this case was important, for prospective buy-
ers knew that getting a Macintosh was a good investment only in case the
Macintosh would turn out a success. The book has many more examples, of
course.
Computer Scientist: The issue of common knowledge and how it is created
is a topic in its own right. Let’s get back to it at another occasion (see page
??).
Philosopher: At some point the discussion also touched on cultural relativism.
One of Rohit’s examples was about queueing for buses. He had noticed that
shelters at bus stops near Wassenaar have advertisements on all sides except
for the side where you see the bus approaching if you are inside the shelter,
and where the driver sees you, of course. Also, in his talk he had mentioned
signs in London with ‘queue this side please,’ as examples of social software.
In connection with this, Sadik Al-Azm remarked that boarding a bus in Cairo
or Damascus is rather different than boarding a bus in London or Wassenaar.
It involves different skills: London bus boarding habits would simply fail to
get you a place. If social software designers were hoping to come up with
proposals to improve bus boarding procedures for Cairo or Damascus, he
wished them good luck.
Ethicist: Here Rohit’s reply was that social software analysis should always
take how people actually behave and what they actually believe as given, and
propose small adjustments to improve a given situation.
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Computer Scientist: Another thing that raised questions was the issue of
strategic behaviour. What is it? Is it good, is it bad, or are moral qualifica-
tions of it beside the point? Should social software be designed in such a way
that possibilities for strategic behaviour get minimized? If so, why?
Philosopher: Yes, this issue came up in an amusing way during the discus-
sion. At the start of the discussion many hands were raised, and someone
proposed to chairman Wim Blockmans that people who wanted to ask follow-
up questions should raise a single finger, while people who wanted to address
a different aspect of the lecture should raise their whole hand.
Computer Scientist: Yes, and someone then remarked that when Sadik Al-
Azm raised a single finger and asked a question about something completely
different, this was a nice example of strategic behaviour. Sadik was only
mildly amused, it seemed. Others thought his reaction was quite funny.
Philosopher: Maybe we should try to make explicit—or at least say something
illuminating about—how social software relates to moral debate. The moral
aspects of some of Rohit’s examples seemed to baffle the audience.
Computer Scientist: One of Rohit’s examples during the lecture revolved
around the notions of agency, ability, and responsibility. Rohit asked us to
imagine a trolley moving downhill along a track, with malfunctioning brakes.
You are standing beside the track. The only way you can prevent it to kill five
people standing on the track is by switching a lever, to divert the trolley to
a different track. The trouble is that there is also a person standing on that
other track, who will certainly get killed as a result of the diversion. The point
of the example is the distinction between moral responsibility for one’s action
and moral responsibility for one’s inaction. Not touching the lever makes one
guilty through inaction, switching the lever makes one guilty through active
involvement. Guilt through inaction presupposes the ability to act, of course.
Political Scientist: I can see why this made the audience uneasy. If fine meta-
physical distinctions like the difference between sins of commission and sins of
omission are relevant for a ‘science’ of social software, one might reasonably
ask whether one is doing exact science at all. Science can only flourish where
one has learned ways to put metaphysical worries on hold.
Philosopher: Anyway, when time was up, there were still many questions
left unanswered. Is analysis of how procedures are incorporated in social
institutions also part of the task of social software? What does social software
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have to say about how we interact with banks, schools and churches? Does
social software provide analysis, or does it make recommendations? And if
both: how do the two relate? Does social software take a moral stance? If
so, what is the foundation? If not, how can it still make recommendations? I
seem to remember that some part of the audience thought that it was strange
that value judgements like “order is better than chaos”, or “it is better if less
people get hurt” seemed to play a role.
Ethicist: Questions, questions. Does anyone care for a coffee?
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